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Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and  
Trade During the Cold War†
By Daniel Berger, William Easterly, Nathan Nunn,  
and Shanker Satyanath*
We provide evidence that increased political influence, arising from 
CIA interventions during the Cold War, was used to create a larger 
foreign market for American products. Following CIA interventions, 
imports from the US increased dramatically, while total exports to 
the US were unaffected. The surge in imports was concentrated in 
industries in which the US had a comparative disadvantage, not a 
comparative advantage. Our analysis is able to rule out decreased 
trade costs, changing political ideology, and an increase in US loans 
and grants as alternative explanations. We provide evidence that the 
increased imports arose through direct purchases of American prod-
ucts by foreign governments. (JEL D72, F14, F54, N42, N72)
History provides us with many examples of the use of political power to promote 
trade and other national interests, the starkest being the unequal treaties imposed 
by Western powers on China and Japan during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries (Findlay and O’Rourke 2007). However, the general question of whether 
power is an important determinant of international trade, particularly in the more 
recent past, is difficult to examine empirically because shifts in power relations 
between governments are often the result of decisions that are made behind the veil 
of government secrecy.
In this paper, we surmount this problem by relying on the use of recently declassi-
fied CIA documents to generate a country- and year-specific measure of the influence 
of the US government over foreign countries. We identify instances where US covert 
services engaged in interventions that installed and/or supported political leaders in 
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other countries. Our interpretation is that the US government had greater influence 
over foreign leaders that were installed and supported by the CIA. Examining the 
relationship between US influence and annual bilateral trade, we find that US influ-
ence raised the share of total imports that the intervened country purchased from the 
US. We find no change in the total value of goods imported from the world. Instead, 
increased US influence caused a shift from products produced in other countries and 
toward US products. Despite the robust finding of increased imports from the US, 
we find no evidence that interventions caused an increase in exports to the US.
These findings are consistent with US political influence being used to create a 
larger market for US products in the intervened country. Although we are unable to 
identify the exact impetus behind the increase in US exports, it most likely arose 
from US firms that stood to gain from increased overseas sales, and through stan-
dard political economy mechanisms, were able to lobby the US government.1
We provide evidence that the increased imports of US products arose through 
direct government purchases. We find that the effect of successful interventions on 
the purchase of US products is increasing in the government’s share of GDP. For the 
countries in the sample with the smallest government share, we find that the effect 
of interventions on US imports is close to zero. This suggests that essentially all 
of the effect can be explained by government purchases of US products. We also 
examine heterogeneous effects across different industries and find larger impacts in 
industries in which governments tend to be important purchasers and importers. We 
also test for other mechanisms, such as changing tariffs or FDI policies, but find no 
evidence that these played an important role.
We recognize that there are many plausible alternative interpretations for these 
findings. In addition to the political-influence explanation, there are three leading 
alternative interpretations. The first is that successful interventions decreased bilat-
eral trading costs between the US and the intervened country, and this caused an 
asymmetric increase in trade flows. The second is that the newly installed and/or 
supported leaders were ideologically more aligned with Western capitalist countries. 
This caused the intervened countries to import more from all Western countries, 
including the US. The third explanation is that following a successful intervention, 
US foreign aid increased, which caused an increase in the purchase of US products.
We test for the trade-costs explanation by examining the effects of CIA interven-
tions on imports from the US in different industries. We show that the increase 
in imports from the US was greatest for goods which the US had a comparative 
disadvantage in producing. That is, the new goods that were shipped from the US 
to the intervened country were products that US firms were less competitive in pro-
ducing. This pattern is inconsistent with decreasing trade costs being the source of 
increased imports. Standard models of international trade do not predict greater spe-
cialization in comparative disadvantage industries. Instead, integration should cause 
each  country to expand production and exports in industries in which they have a 
comparative advantage. The finding is consistent, however, with US influence being 
1 In theory, it is possible that following a CIA intervention, the intervened-country gains influence over the US. 
This would be the case if a CIA intervention signals a greater US stake in the survival of the new regime. While 
this is very plausible, our findings of an asymmetric impact on US imports but not US exports, combined with the 
greater increase in US imports in low comparative advantage products (described later), are most consistent with 
interventions resulting in greater net influence of the US over the intervened country, rather than vice versa.
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used to  create a larger market for products that firms would otherwise have difficulty 
selling internationally.2
We then turn to the political ideology explanation and test whether the increase 
in imports from the US arose because the newly installed regimes were more pro-
Western and pro-capitalist than the previous regimes, and therefore imported more 
from all Western countries, including the US. Examining the effects of successful 
interventions on imports from all countries (not just from the US), we find that US 
interventions did not cause an increase in imports from countries that were ideologi-
cally similar to the US.
Last, we turn to the increased US loans and grants explanation, testing whether 
US economic aid, military aid, or Export-Import Bank loans increased following a 
successful intervention. We find that interventions led to an increase in economic 
aid, military aid, and Export-Import Bank loans, but that these can only account for, 
at most, 16 percent of the total impact of CIA interventions on imports from the US.
Although our baseline estimating equations control for country-specific time-
invariant factors (with country fixed effects) and time-specific country-invariant 
factors (with time-period fixed effects), it is possible that the estimates are biased by 
omitted factors that simultaneously vary by time and country. For example, success-
ful CIA interventions may have been more likely following a temporary decline in 
imports from the US. This form of selection will result in inflated estimates of the 
effect of US influence on imports from the US. We undertake a number of strategies 
to control for this, including the use of pre-trends, pre-intervention fixed effects, and 
controls for observable characteristics. The results remain robust.
Our analysis of the impacts of CIA interventions links our study to others that 
also empirically examine the history of CIA activities during the Cold War. Dube, 
Kaplan, and Naidu (2011) examine the stock prices of US companies in Iran, 
Guatemala, Cuba, and Chile before and after the CIA authorized plans for covert 
coups. They find that the stock returns of companies that were both connected to 
the CIA and stood to gain from the coups increased immediately after the authori-
zations. The authors argue that these findings provide evidence that the top-secret 
plans were leaked to investors. The focus of our analysis nicely complements the 
emphasis of Dube, Kaplan, and Naidu (2011). Since the authors are interested in 
the effects of top-secret information flows (and not of the interventions themselves), 
they do not include the period of the actual intervention in their analysis. In contrast, 
our analysis looks at the consequences of the interventions after they are actually 
carried out. Also related is Berger et al. (2010), who use lower frequency data at 
five year intervals to examine the effect of interventions on democracy. They find 
that CIA and KGB interventions have a negative effect on subsequent democracy.
Our analysis also extends theoretical studies examining the interplay between 
political influence and international trade. The hypothesis that influence and power 
play a role in international trade dates back to at least Hirschman (1945). More 
recently, the theoretical contribution of Antràs and Padró-i-Miquel (2011) examines 
the welfare impacts when political influence can affect trade and trade policies. Our 
findings also complement existing studies that attempt to empirically estimate the 
2 As discussed, the US government’s desire to increase the overseas sale of these products likely arose through 
firms’ lobbying within the US.
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effects of political influence on trade flows. An example is Yeats’ (1990) analysis, 
showing that among African countries, former colonies pay a 20–30 percent pre-
mium on the price of imported steel when importing from their former colonizer.3
Finally, our findings also contribute to a large literature in political science exam-
ining how political economy factors affect trade. Existing studies, in particular 
Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff (2000, 2002) and Aidt and Gassebner (2010), 
examine the effects of political regime type (i.e., democratic versus non-democratic 
regimes) on trade flows.4 In contrast to the findings about the extent of democracy 
in a regime, our findings show the importance of US influence over foreign regimes 
arising from CIA interventions.5
The next section of the paper describes the data and their sources and Section II 
derives our estimating equations. Section III reports our baseline estimates showing 
that successful CIA interventions coincide with increased imports of US goods, no 
increase in exports to the US, and no increase in total trade. In Section IV, we provide 
evidence that the increased imports from the US likely arose through direct government 
purchases by the newly installed regime. In Section V, we test for alternative explana-
tions and show that our findings cannot be explained by decreased trade costs, changing 
political ideology, or an increase in US loans and grants. Section VI concludes.
I. Data on CIA Interventions
As a source of variation in US influence over a country, we rely on episodes where 
the CIA successfully intervened in foreign countries to either install a new leader or 
to provide support to an existing leader to help maintain the power of the regime. 
To identify these episodes, we rely on studies that document the history of the Cold 
War, typically based on recently declassified documents. Using these sources, we 
construct an annual dataset of interventions successfully undertaken by the CIA. We 
also construct analogous measures for successful Soviet KGB interventions, which 
we use as a control in the analysis. The most heavily used sources include Blum 
(2003), Weiner (2007), Westad (2005), Yergin (1991), and the Library of Congress’ 
Country Studies Series for the CIA interventions, and Andrew and Mitrokhin (1999, 
2005) for KGB interventions. Full details of the data construction and sources are 
reported in the online Appendix.
We restrict our analysis to the Cold War period, 1947–1989, because CIA docu-
ments for the post Cold War period largely remain subject to government secrecy. 
This is the case, in part, because only classified CIA documents older than 25 years 
fall under the Freedom of Information Act, but also because nearly all documents 
3 Also related are studies that provide evidence for power and influence playing a role in other international set-
tings. For example, Dreher and Jensen (2007) show that IMF conditionality is correlated with whether countries 
vote in-line with the US in the UN General Assembly. Similarly, Kilby (2009) shows that the World Bank’s struc-
tural adjustment conditions are less stringent for countries whose voting in the UN is more aligned with the US. 
Kuziemko and Werker (2006) show that when countries have a seat on the UN security council they receive more 
foreign aid from the US.
4 Also see Verdier (1998), Russett and Oneal (2001), Frye and Mansfield (2003), Kono (2006), and Mansfield, 
Milner, and Pevehouse (2008).
5 One can interpret our measure of covert CIA interventions as a measure of US “client states” or “puppet lead-
ers,” which are well-established subjects of analysis in the qualitative political science literature (e.g., Sylvan and 
Majeski 2009). Therefore, an alternative interpretation of our analysis is of the effects of US influence on client 
states and puppet leaders on trade flows.
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from the Cold War period—even those younger than 25 years—are now publicly 
available and have been extensively studied and synthesized by Cold War histori-
ans. Once we move beyond 1989 our coding of interventions is based on much less 
information and therefore is significantly less certain.6
Our baseline measure of successful CIA interventions is an indicator variable 
that equals one, in a country and year, if the CIA either installed a foreign leader 
or provided covert support for the regime once in power. We label this variable 
USinfluenc e t, c . The activities used by the CIA to install and help maintain the power 
of specific regimes were many and varied. They included the creation and dissemi-
nation of (often false) propaganda, usually through radio, television, newspapers, 
and pamphlets. They also included covert political operations, which typically con-
sisted of the provision of funds and expertise for political campaigns. More invasive 
tactics included the destruction of physical infrastructure and capital, as well as 
covert paramilitary operations, that included the supply of arms and military equip-
ment, direct involvement in insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, and the 
coordination of coups and assassinations (Johnson 1989, 1992).7
There are many instances in which the CIA set out to remove an existing leader and 
install a new leader in power. The CIA-organized coups in Iran in 1953, Guatemala 
in 1954, and Chile in 1973 are the most well-known examples of such cases. For 
these interventions, the indicator variable USinfluenc e t, c takes on the value of one. 
In other cases, the CIA began to provide support for leaders currently in power. In 
these cases, the CIA did not engage in activities to install the leader into power, but 
once in power, at some point, the CIA began to engage in activities to help main-
tain the power of the regime. Typically, these were covert counterinsurgency opera-
tions undertaken by the CIA. We also code as one these cases in which the leader 
maintains power with the help of the CIA.8 As a robustness check, we disaggregate 
our baseline indicator variable, distinguishing between intervention episodes that 
installed and then supported a leader and episodes that propped up existing leaders. 
We find that both types of interventions have quantitatively similar impacts.
As a concrete illustration of the construction of our variable, we use the history of 
the CIA in Chile. CIA involvement in Chile first occurred in the 1964 Presidential 
election, when the CIA provided covert funding and support for the Christian 
Democratic Party candidate Eduardo Frei Montalva. Eduardo Frei won the election 
and continued to receive CIA support while he was in power. In the 1970 election, 
Salvador Allende, a candidate from a coalition of leftist parties, was elected, and 
remained in power until the famous CIA orchestrated coup of 1973. After the coup, 
Augusto Pinochet took power and was backed by the CIA until 1988. Since our 
indicator for successful CIA interventions, USinfluenc e t, c , equals one in all years 
6 An additional benefit of examining only the Cold War era is that there is greater comparability over time, so that 
our coefficient estimates are likely more stable across the years of our sample. This is less likely to be true once we 
pool the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods.
7 Our analysis does not distinguish between different types of intervention episodes. It is possible that the 
impact of CIA interventions on trade is heterogeneous, depending on specific characteristics of an intervention. 
Our analysis does not examine this potential heterogeneity, but instead simply examines the average effect across 
all interventions.
8 A good example of this is the CIA’s involvement in Haiti. Paul Magloire, François “Papa Doc” Duvalier, and 
Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier were not installed by the CIA, but were reliant on CIA support to help maintain 
their power.
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in which a leader is installed or supported by the CIA, for Chile the variable equals 
one from 1964 to 1970 when Eduardo Frei was in power. It equals zero in 1971 and 
1972, the years when Salvador Allende was in office (since he was not installed 
or supported by the CIA). It then equals one from 1973 to 1988, the years when 
Augusto Pinochet, who was installed and supported by the CIA, was in power.9
Our empirical analysis examines a sample of 166 countries, which includes all 
countries for which necessary data are available, except the US and the Soviet 
Union.10 Among the 166 countries, 51 were subject to at least one CIA intervention 
between 1947 and 1989.11 In an average year between 1947 and 1989, 25 countries 
were experiencing a CIA intervention. Among the group of countries that experi-
enced an intervention between 1947 and 1989, the typical country experienced 21 
years of interventions.
Examining the total number of successful CIA interventions in each year, we find 
that there is a steady increase after 1947 until the 1970s, after which the number 
falls until 1989.12 This pattern is consistent with the known history of the CIA. 
Between 1953 and 1961 covert action increased significantly, with attention focused 
on political action, particularly support to political figures and political parties. The 
1960s witnessed a continued presence of CIA covert activities, although there was a 
shift toward greater paramilitary activities. The period from 1964 to 1967 is known 
to have been the high point of CIA covert activities, with the post-1967 slow-down 
brought about, in part, by the 1967 Ramparts magazine article that exposed the 
CIA’s funding of national student groups and other private organizations (Leary 
1984). Consistent with history, our data show a leveling off of covert interventions 
in the late 1960s until the mid-1970s, after which the number falls.13
The map shown in Figure 1 reports for each country the fraction of years between 
1947 and 1989 for which there was a CIA intervention.14 The cross-country distri-
bution of interventions is consistent with the descriptive history of CIA activities 
during the Cold War. The CIA intervened most heavily in Latin America, but also 
in a few European countries—namely, Italy and Greece—as well as in a number of 
countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.
The map also helps to illustrate exactly what our intervention variable captures 
and what it does not capture. For example, our intervention variable is zero for 
Angola throughout the period. This is so despite the heavy and well-known involve-
ment of the CIA in Angola’s civil war, where they provided covert support for the 
9 A potential source of imprecision arises from the fact that our data are measured at annual frequencies, while in 
reality CIA activities occurred in continuous time. This results in some imprecision when coding USinfluenc e t, c . For 
the case of Chile, since Salvador Allende won the election on September 4, 1970, it is unclear whether we should 
code USinfluenc e t, c as one or zero for 1970. In constructing our measure we code onset and offset years as being 
an intervention year. Therefore, since 1970 is an offset year of the CIA’s support of Eduardo Frei, it is coded as 
one. We have checked that none of our results depend on this decision. Choosing instead to code onset- and offset-
intervention years as zero yields results that are virtually identical to what we report here.
10 Our panel is unbalanced, since countries do not enter the sample until they gain independence. Countries that 
split or merge are treated as new countries in the dataset. A description of how exactly we deal with these cases is 
provided in the online Appendix.
11 Similarly, 25 countries were subject to at least one successful KGB intervention.
12 See Figure A1 of the online Appendix for details.
13 The slight lag in the decline after 1967 results from the persistence of ongoing intervention episodes, since 
newly installed or newly supported leaders were often supported by the CIA for their remaining tenure.
14 For countries that did not gain independence until after 1947, we report the fraction of years from indepen-
dence to 1989 for which there was a CIA intervention.
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anticommunist group Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) (e.g., 
Weissman 1979). However, the group was never successful at gaining power from 
the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA). Because the US-backed 
UNITA forces never gained control of the government, our variable is not coded as 
one for Angola, despite clear involvement by the CIA in the country. The example 
illustrates that our intervention measure is not a measure of all CIA meddling or 
activities in a country. Rather, it is an indicator of CIA activities that were successful 
at either installing a new leader or in maintaining the power of an existing leader. 
Therefore, it should be kept in mind that throughout the paper, when we refer to 
“CIA interventions,” we are referring specifically to interventions by the CIA that 
were successful at installing or maintaining the power of specific leaders.
Using CIA covert activities to measure changes in US influence over foreign 
countries has a number of particularly attractive characteristics. First, because these 
interventions were covert at the time, they were largely unaffected by US public 
opinion and the opinion of other countries, which reduces one source of endogeneity 
in our measure.15 Further, because the interventions affect the leader in power, they 
are significant and potentially have an important impact on US government influ-
ence over the regime.
Our analysis also relies on trade data from the Correlates of War (COW) Trade 
Dataset, Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2008), which reports annual aggregate 
 bilateral trade flows (measured in millions of nominal US dollars).16 All other data 
from our analysis are described as they are used.
15 The findings from Dube, Kaplan, and Naidu (2011) suggest a potentially important caveat here. They show 
that the stock prices of multinational corporations that stood to gain from the coups responded after top secret 
authorizations were made. In fact, stock prices responded more to these authorizations than to the actual coups 
themselves. These findings suggest that while the general public was uninformed about covert CIA actions at the 
time, this may not have been true for a politically connected subset of the population.
16 For the post WWII period, the data are originally from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade 
Statistics. Exploiting the fact that all transactions are potentially recorded by both importing and exporting coun-
tries, Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins impute missing flows by using, for example, the exporter’s trade statistics if data 
on imports are missing from the importer’s accounts. Because importing countries typically keep more precise 
Figure 1. Map Showing the Fraction of Years between 1947 and 1989 with a CIA Intervention
0–1% 1–10%  20–40%   40–60%   60–80% 80–100%     Not in sample
Years with US influence = 1, Proportion, 1947–1989
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II. Estimating Equations
Our estimating equations are based on the gravity model of international trade, 
which has become the conventional framework for estimating the determinants of 
trade flows. The gravity model can be derived formally from a number of theoretical 
environments. Consider, for example, the setting from Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003).17 Here, trade between country c and e in year t is given by
(1)  m t, c, e =   Y t, c Y t, e  _ Y t W   [  τ t, c, e  _  P t, c  P t, e  ] 1−σ ,
where  m t, c, e denotes imports into country c from exporter e in year t,  Y t, c is total GDP 
of importing country c in year t,  Y t, e is total GDP of exporting country e in year t, and 
Y t W is world GDP in year t. The parameter σ is the elasticity of substitution between 
goods,  τ t, c, e measures bilateral trade related costs when shipping goods from country 
e to c, and  P t, c and  P t, e are multilateral resistance terms for countries c and e, which 
are complex non-linear functions of the full set of bilateral cost terms { τ t, c, e }.18
Taking natural logs and rearranging gives
(2)  ln   m t, c, e  _  Y t, c Y t, e  = −ln  Y t 
W + (1 − σ)ln  τ t, c, e −(1 − σ)[ln  P t c + ln  P t, e ] .
Estimating equation (2) faces the challenge of accounting for the importer and 
exporter multilateral resistance terms,  P t, c and  P t, e .
Our analysis uses the estimation method proposed by Baier and Bergstrand 
(2009), where the multilateral resistance terms are approximated using a first-order 
log-linear Taylor series expansion. Baier and Bergstrand characterize the resulting 
approximation terms and show that the technique generates estimates that are virtu-
ally identical to the nonlinear estimation of the full system of equations proposed by 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). With the additional assumption of symmetry, 
the multilateral resistance terms [ln  P t, c + ln  P t, e ] are given by19
(3)  ln  P t, c + ln  P t, e =  ∑ 
i=1
N
  θ t, i ln  τ t, c, i +  ∑ 
j=1
N
  θ t, j ln  τ t, j, e −  ∑ 
k=1
N
  ∑ 
m=1
 
N
  θ t, k  θ t, m ln  τ t, k, m ,
where  θ t, i ≡  Y t, i / Y t W .20
records of shipments (because of the existence of tariffs) than exporting countries, the dataset uses importing coun-
try accounts when both sources exist. A full discussion is provided in Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2008, 2009). In 
particular, see Table 1 of Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009).
17 Alternative foundations are provided by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Chaney (2008).
18 See equation (12) of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for the derivation and a general discussion.
19 See, in particular, Section III and Appendix A of Baier and Bergstrand (2009).
20 An alternative is to use equal weights, rather than GDP weights, in the construction of the approximation 
terms, i.e.,  θ t, i = 1/N where N is the number of countries. The results are qualitatively identical if this is done.
871Berger et al .: CommerCial imperialism?Vol. 103 No. 2
We assume that bilateral trade costs are given by
(4)   τ t, c, e ≡  e  μ 1 ln dis t c, e +  μ 2  I c, e lang +  μ 3  I c, e border +  μ 4  I t, c, e gatt +  μ 5  I t, c, e rta  ,
where ln dis t c, e is the natural log of the distance between country e and c,  I c, e 
lang is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the two countries share a common language, 
I c, e 
border is an indicator for the two countries sharing a border,  I t, c, e 
gatt
 is an indicator that 
equals one if both countries are GATT participants in year t, and  I t, c, e 
rta
 equals one if 
both countries belong to a regional trade agreement in year t.21
Substituting equation (4) into (3) gives
(5)  ln  P t, c + ln  P t, e =  μ 1  X c, e dist +  μ 2  X c, e lang +  μ 3  X c, e border +  μ 4  X t, c, e gatt +  μ 5  X t, c, e rta ,
where
   X c, e 
dist ≡   ∑ 
i=1
N
  θ t, i ln dis t c, i +  ∑ 
j=1
N
  θ t, j ln dis t j, e −  ∑ 
k=1
N
  ∑ 
m=1
 
N
  θ t, k θ t, m ln dis t k, m 
   X c, e l ≡  ∑ 
i=1
N
  θ t, i  I c, i l +  ∑ 
j=1
N
  θ t, j  I j, e l −  ∑ 
k=1
N
  ∑ 
m=1
 
N
  θ t, k  θ t, m  I k, m l for l = lang, border
   X t, c, e l ≡  ∑ 
i=1
N
  θ t, i  I t, c, i l +  ∑ 
j=1
N
  θ t, j  I t, j, e l −  ∑ 
k=1
N
  ∑ 
m=1
 
N
  θ t, k  θ t, m  I t, k, m l for l = gatt, rta .
We can then use the observable variables given in equations (4) and (5) to control 
for trade costs  τ t, c, e and the multilateral resistance terms [ln  P t, c + ln  P t, e ] that appear 
in equation (2).22
The primary impact of interest is how increased US influence, through CIA 
interventions, affected trade with the US. Therefore, our baseline estimating equa-
tion examines the impact of a CIA intervention in country c on country c’s trade 
with the US.23 First, consider country c’s imports from the US, which we denote 
m t, c 
US . This can be expressed as
  m t, c 
US =   Y t, c  Y t US  _ Y t W   [  τ t, c US  _  P t, c  P t US  ] 1−σ ,
21 Distances are calculated manually as the great circle distance between the centroid of each country. Data on 
trading partners with common language, with contiguous borders, and belonging to a regional trade agreement are 
from Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010). Data on GATT participation are from Tomz, Goldstein, and Rivers (2007).
22 Among the five determinants of trade costs, there is particular concern about the endogeneity of regional trade 
agreements (see Baier and Bergstrand 2007). The estimates reported below are completely robust to the omission 
of this determinant of bilateral trade costs. As well, the results are also similar if we omit GATT participation as 
a determinant.
23 An alternative estimation strategy is to examine bilateral trade between all countries and examine how CIA 
interventions differentially impacted a country’s trade with the US (relative to its trade with all other countries). 
As we report in Section VB, this generates estimates that are very similar to our baseline strategy. A disadvantage 
of a full bilateral analysis is that, even with clustered standard errors, one runs the risk of generating downward-
biased standard errors (see Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004; Erikson, Pinto, and Rader 2009). Our baseline 
strategy has only N × T observations rather than the N(N − 1)T observations in the bilateral sample (where N is the 
number of countries and T is the number of time periods).
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where  Y t 
US denotes US total income,  P t 
US denotes the multilateral resistance term for 
the US, and  τ t, c US is the trade friction between the US and country c. Taking natural 
logs and rearranging gives
(6)  ln   m t, c US  _ Y t, c   = ln  
 Y t 
US 
 _ Y t W   + (1 − σ) ln  τ t, c 
US − (1 − σ)[ln  P t US + ln  P t, c ] .
Our analysis is interested in identifying the reduced-form impact of US influence 
on a country’s trade with the US. Because it is possible that some of the mechanisms 
underlying this relationship lie outside of the standard gravity model of interna-
tional trade, we estimate equation (6) and include CIA interventions as an additional 
determinant of trade flows, thus estimating the reduced-form relationship between 
CIA interventions and imports from the US:
(7) ln   m t, c 
US 
 _ Y t, c   =  α t +  α c + β  USinfluence t, c + ϕ ln  τ t, c 
US − ϕ[ln  P t US + ln  P t, c ]+  X t, c Γ +  ε t, c .
The dependent variable, ln  
 m t, c 
US 
 _ Y t, c   , is the natural log of imports into country c from 
the US normalized by country c’s total GDP.24 Our primary coefficient of interest 
is β, which captures the average reduced-form impact of CIA interventions on the 
countries that experience an intervention.25
The first terms in equation (6), ln   Y t US  _ Y t W   , are absorbed by the year fixed effects  α t 
in equation (7). Trade costs, ln  τ t, c US, are controlled for with the observables given in 
equation (4) and the multilateral resistance terms, [ P t, c +  P t US ], are controlled using 
the observable terms given in equation (5). Guided by the theory, in  equation (7), 
the coefficients for ln  τ t, c US and [ P t, c +  P t US ] are constrained to have the same 
 coefficients but with opposite signs.
Equation (7) also includes country fixed effects,  α c , which capture time-invariant 
country characteristics that may be correlated with both trade with the US and CIA 
interventions. We also control for a vector of time-varying control variables  X t, c , 
which includes the natural log of per capita income and an indicator for Soviet/KGB 
interventions, measured in the same manner as CIA interventions. Motivated by recent 
studies showing that leaders matter (e.g., Jones and Olken 2005, 2009), we control 
for an indicator variable that equals one if there is a change in leadership, as well as 
a measure of the tenure of the current leader. Our final control variable is motivated 
by the findings from Berger et al. (2010), showing that successful CIA interventions 
adversely impacted democracy. We control for an indicator variable that equals one if 
an observation is a democracy, as defined by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010).26
24 Trade and income are both measured in millions of nominal US dollars.
25 Because we use an indicator variable that captures the existence of all interventions, without distinguishing 
between intensity or type, our estimate does not identify heterogeneous impacts which may underlie the average effect. 
We have tested for temporal and spatial heterogeneity. We find some evidence of heterogeneous impacts. For example, 
we find that the impact of CIA interventions is greater than average in the 1950s and weaker than average in the 1970s. 
We also find evidence of a weaker effect among African countries. These results are reported in the  online Appendix.
26 Using the Polity measure of democracy yields virtually identical estimates to what we report here. Unlike the 
Polity measure, which is based on subjective perceptions about the extent of democracy, the Cheibub, Gandhi, and 
Vreeland (2010) measure is based on objective criteria about the extent to which government positions are filled by 
contested elections (see e.g., Alvarez et al. 1996).
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In auxiliary regressions, we also examine the effect of CIA interventions on 
exports to the US. The estimating equation for exports is derived in an analogous 
manner as equation (7) and is given by
(8) ln   x t, c 
US 
 _ Y t, c  =  α t +  α c + β USinfluenc e t, c + ϕ ln  τ t, c US − ϕ[ln  P t US + ln  P t, c ] +  X t, c Γ +  ε t, c ,
where c now indexes exporters and  x t, c 
US denotes the values of exports from country 
c to the US.
III. Baseline Estimation Results
We now turn to our estimation results, which are reported in Table 1. Column 1 
reports estimates of equation (7) without controlling for the multilateral resistance 
terms. The equation does, however, include country fixed effects and year fixed 
effects. We find that the coefficient on the US intervention measure, USinfluenc e t, c , 
is positive and statistically significant. The estimated coefficient of 0.283 implies 
that in intervention years a country’s trade with the US is 28.3 percent greater than 
in non-intervention years. This is a sizable impact.
In column 2, we do not control for country fixed effects but do control for countries’ 
multilateral resistance terms using the Baier and Bergstrand (2009) approximation 
method described in the previous section. The estimated impact is much larger with 
a coefficient of 0.776. In column 3, we include both the Baier and Bergstrand multi-
lateral resistance terms and country fixed effects. The estimated coefficient is 0.293. 
The relative magnitudes of the coefficients from columns 1–3 show the importance 
of controlling for country fixed effects. When these are not included in the table, the 
estimated impact of CIA interventions are over twice as large. This suggests the exis-
tence of time-invariant country characteristics that if not properly taken into account 
generate an upward bias in our coefficients of interest. As well, once country fixed 
effects are accounted for, additionally controlling for the Baier and Bergstrand mul-
tilateral resistance terms has no noticeable impact on our estimate of interest β. This 
most likely reflects the fact that a country’s multilateral resistance term typically does 
not change drastically from one year to the next. Therefore, most of the variation in 
the term is in the cross section and is captured to a large extent by the country fixed 
effects. Throughout the rest of the analysis, we control for both country fixed effects 
and the Baier and Bergstrand multilateral resistance terms.27
To gain a better understanding of the source of the increased imports from the 
US, we examine whether aggregate imports also increased following interven-
tions. US imports may have risen either because of trade creation (in which case 
27 An alternative to having country fixed effects is to estimate the equations in first differences. With this strategy, 
the impact of US influence is identified from the differences between (i) the year before the beginning of an inter-
vention episode and the first year (onset) of the intervention episode, and (ii) the last year (offset) of an intervention 
episode and the following year, which is the first non-intervention year. In all other years the first-difference is equal 
to zero. Because our data are measured annually, the onset and offset years are only partial intervention periods, 
and as a result, first-difference estimates, unlike the fixed effects estimates, are identified solely from comparisons 
of non-intervention periods to partial-intervention periods. We, therefore, expect first-differenced estimates to yield 
estimates that are biased toward zero, and do not use this estimation strategy. Consistent with the nature of this bias, 
we find that the point estimates we obtain from first differencing are smaller. For example, for the specification from 
column 3 of Table 1, the point estimate is 0.085 and the standard error is 0.059, which is statistically significant at 
the 15 percent level, but not the 10 percent level.
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Table 1— The Effects of US Interventions on Trade with the US and the Rest of the World
ln normalized imports from the US
ln normalized 
imports from 
the world
ln normalized 
exports  
to the US
ln normalized 
exports  
to the world
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US influence 0.283** 0.776*** 0.293*** −0.009 0.058 0.000
(0.110) (0.143) (0.109) (0.045) (0.122) (0.052)
Control variables
ln per capita income 0.352** 0.327*** 0.296** 0.129 1.234*** 0.647***
(0.148) (0.068) (0.148) (0.111) (0.239) (0.134)
Soviet intervention −1.129** −1.434*** −1.067** −0.080 −0.682** −0.082
 control (0.456) (0.307) (0.430) (0.102) (0.307) (0.100)
Leader turnover indicator 0.008 −0.089* 0.001 0.026 0.028 0.037*
(0.037) (0.051) (0.037) (0.018) (0.039) (0.022)
Leader tenure 0.003 −0.013 0.003 0.005** 0.013** 0.006*
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004)
Democracy indicator 0.112 0.159 0.121* 0.069 0.065 0.082
(0.075) (0.142) (0.073) (0.053) (0.094) (0.058)
Trade cost/B&B MR controls
ln Distance −0.309*** −0.277*** −0.127*** −0.214*** −0.143***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.026) (0.079) (0.029)
Contiguous border 1.476*** 2.952* −0.274 1.965 −0.104
 indicator (0.408) (1.709) (0.516) (2.648) (0.415)
Common language 0.425* 1.430 −0.847** 3.676*** 0.145
 indicator (0.241) (1.204) (0.343) (1.280) (0.355)
GATT participant 0.033 0.057 −0.075 0.365 −0.086
 indicator (0.507) (0.549) (0.055) (0.561) (0.063)
Regional trade agreement 1.475** −1.216** −1.200*** −1.283 −1.126***
 indicator (0.672) (0.532) (0.205) (0.882) (0.266)
Country fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 R 2 0.828 0.839 0.836 0.952 0.824 0.947
Observations 4,149 4,149 4,149 4,149 3,922 3,922
Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t, where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. The dependent variable in 
columns 1−3 is the natural log of imports from the US divided by total GDP. In column 4, the dependent variable is 
the natural log of imports from the world divided by the product of the country’s total GDP and all other countries’ 
total GDP (see Appendix A for details). In column 5, the dependent variable is the natural log of exports to the US 
divided by total GDP. In column 6, the dependent variable is the natural log of exports to the world divided by the 
product of the country’s total GDP and the sum of all other countries’ total GDP. All regressions include year fixed 
effects, a Soviet intervention control, ln per capita income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, an 
indicator for GATT participation, an indicator for a preferential trade agreement with the US, and a democracy indi-
cator. Columns 1 and 3−6 include country fixed effects. Columns 2−6 include controls for trade costs and the Baier 
and Bergstrand (2009) multilateral resistance terms. These are a function of the natural log of bilateral distance, 
an indicator variable for a common language, an indicator variable for a shared border, an indicator for both trad-
ing partners being GATT participants, and an indicator for the trading partners being part of a regional trade agree-
ment. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors with a maximum lag of 40 reported in brackets. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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aggregate imports would also rise), or because of trade diversion (in which case 
aggregate imports would stay the same).28 The estimates for total imports, reported 
in  column 4, show that the impact of interventions on aggregate imports is not sta-
tistically different from zero. Further, this is the result of a small coefficient that is 
precisely estimated and not because of large standard errors. This suggests that the 
increased share of imports from the US arose from a shift away from imports from 
other countries and toward imports from the US. We confirm this finding in our 
bilateral regression analysis reported in Section VB, where we explicitly estimate 
the trade-diversion impact of CIA interventions.
We next ask whether intervened countries also experienced an increase in their 
exports to the US. Column 5 reports estimates of equation (8). The results show that, 
unlike US imports, exports to the US were not affected by CIA interventions. In 
 column 6, for completeness, we report estimates of the impact of US interventions 
on aggregate exports.29 We find that interventions had no effect on aggregate exports.
Table 1 also reports the coefficient estimates for all additional control variables. 
These are generally as expected. Soviet interventions tend to decrease trade with 
the US and countries with greater per capita income tend to import and export more 
from all countries, including the US. Consistent with the Linder hypothesis, richer 
countries trade more with the US. We find no evidence that leader turnover or leader 
tenure systematically affect imports from the US. Among the trade cost variables, 
bilateral distance significantly reduces trade, while the coefficients for the other 
trade cost variables are less robust, a fact most likely explained by collinearity with 
the country fixed effects. To conserve on space, in the remaining tables of the paper, 
we suppress the coefficient estimates of the control variables. These are available 
upon request.
Although our estimating equation controls for country-specific time-invariant 
factors and time-specific country-invariant factors that could bias our estimates of 
interest, there remains the concern that our coefficient of interest β may be biased 
due to factors that vary simultaneously by country and time period. The primary 
concern is that there may have been selection in the targeting of CIA interven-
tions and, in particular, that interventions were more common when a country had 
recently experienced a decline in its imports of US products. This is an example of 
the  well-known Ashenfelter dip.
We undertake a number of strategies to reduce any potential bias that may 
arise from the endogeneity of interventions. We control for five year pre-trends 
in the  dependent variable  ( i.e., ln   m t−1, c US  _ Y t−1, c  − ln   m t−6, c US  _ Y t−6, c  ) , which capture potential pre 
-intervention “dips” in imports. We also control for an indicator variable that equals 
one if the observation (country c in period t) is between one and five years prior to the 
onset of an intervention episode. With either strategy, we obtain estimates of β that 
are similar to our baseline estimate (see columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table A1).30
28 The estimating equation for total imports is analogous to equation (7) for US imports, although the multilat-
eral resistance terms, and therefore the Baier and Bergstrand approximation terms, differ slightly. See Appendix A 
for full details.
29 See Appendix A for details about the estimating equation for total exports.
30 This robustness is consistent with historical accounts that emphasize the primarily ideological motivation—
namely the fear of Communism—behind CIA interventions (e.g., Westad 2005, p. 111; Blum 2003, p. 13). Although 
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We also check that our results are robust to controlling for potentially important 
observable factors, like the nature of a country’s foreign relations with the US and 
economic conditions in the foreign country (columns 3 and 4 of Appendix Table A1). 
The foreign relations variables include three indicator variables that identify instances 
in which either the foreign country or the US threatens to use force, displays force, 
or uses force; an indicator variable that equals one if there are US sanctions against 
exporting to the country; and an indicator variable that equals one if the country has 
an alliance with the US. The economic condition variables, which we include in addi-
tion to our baseline control of per capita income, are the one-year average inflation 
rate (between period t − 1 and t) and the real exchange rate.31
We also perform a number of sensitivity tests. We check that our results remain 
robust when estimating a variant of equation (7) using a Poisson pseudo maximum 
likelihood estimator, as suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) (column 1 
of Appendix Table A2).32 Motivated by the observed persistence of trade flows, 
potentially due to hysteresis arising from the fixed costs of exporting, we also check 
that we obtain similar estimates when we control for a one-year lag of the dependent 
variable (columns 2–4 of Appendix Table A2).
We distinguish between intervention episodes that began with the CIA install-
ing a new leader and then providing support for the leader and episodes in which 
the CIA began supporting a pre-existing leader. We disaggregate USinfluenc e t, c into 
two measures: an indicator variable that equals one for interventions of the first type 
(install and support) and an indicator variable that equals one for interventions of 
the second type (support only).33 We find that both types of interventions have very 
similar impacts (column 5 of Table A2).
The final exercise that we perform examines the timing of movements in imports 
from the US before and after the beginning of an intervention episode. We estimate 
the following equation:
(9) ln   m t, c US  _ Y t, c   =   α t +  α c +  ∑ j=1
N
  ϕ j Pr e t, c j +  ∑ 
j=1
N
  θ j Pos t t, c j 
 + ϕln  τ t, c US − ϕ[ln  P t US + ln  P t, c ] +  X t, c Γ +  ε t, c ,
where Pr e t, c 
j
 is an indicator variable that equals one if the observation is j years prior 
to the onset of an intervention episode. Similarly, Pos t t, c 
j
 equals one if the observa-
tion is j years into an intervention episode (i.e., Pos t t, c 1 is the onset year). All other 
variables are as defined in equation (7).
A comparison of the  ϕ j ’s and the  θ j ’s provides a check for an increase in US imports 
after the onset of a CIA intervention. We restrict attention to “install and support” 
economic considerations did play a role—particularly when the foreign country’s movement toward communism or 
socialism meant nationalizing foreign companies—they do not appear to have been the most  important motivation.
31 The military dispute data are from Maoz (2005), the sanctions data are from Hufbauer et al. (2007), the 
alliance data are from the COW Alliance Dataset 3.03, and the inflation and exchange rate data are from the Penn 
World Tables 6.3.
32 In this specification, the dependent variable is the value of imports from the US, rather than the natural log of 
imports from the US normalized by total GDP.
33 In the sample, there are 933 country-year observations with an intervention. Of these, 362 interventions are 
“install and support” interventions and 571 are “support only” interventions. Of the 51 countries that experienced 
an intervention, 27 experienced “install and support” interventions, 19 experienced “support only,” and five experi-
enced an intervention episode of each type.
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interventions, since doing so omits a number of very short interventions, including 
nine one-year counterinsurgency interventions. These short interventions are inap-
propriate for the event study analysis. Because we restrict the event study to “install 
and support” interventions, the set of control variables also includes an indicator vari-
able for “support only” interventions.
The estimation results are reported in Appendix Table A3. Columns 1–4 report 
estimates of the coefficients of the pre and post indicator variables from  equation (9) 
for ten-, eight-, six-, and four-year event windows i.e., for N = 5, 4, 3, 2. Also 
reported are the coefficient estimates for “install and support” intervention periods 
that are outside of the window of analysis, as well as intervention years for “support 
only” interventions.
The estimates are consistent with an impact of CIA interventions on imports from 
the US. During years prior to the beginning of the intervention episode (period t − 1 
and earlier), we do not witness an increase in US imports. None of the coefficients 
are statistically significant. Period t, the first and partial intervention year, witnesses 
only a slight insignificant increase in US imports relative to the level in period t − 1. 
The coefficient for period t is positive in three of the four specifications, but not 
statistically significant. This is most likely due to the fact that this period is only 
a partial intervention, since the intervention begins at some point during this year. 
The first full intervention year, labelled period t + 1, witnesses a sizable increase in 
imports. The coefficients for period t + 1 range from 0.16 to 0.28 and are statisti-
cally significant in two of the four specifications. After this period, the new higher 
level of US imports is maintained. The coefficients range from 0.18 to 0.30, and are 
generally significant.
For a small number of observations, it is the case that some of the periods in 
the pre-intervention window are actually intervention periods and some of the peri-
ods in the post-intervention window are not intervention periods.34 We address 
this issue by interacting the pre-intervention indicator variables with one minus 
USinfluenc e t, c and the post intervention variables with USinfluenc e t, c . This ensures 
that the pre-intervention indicator variables only take on the value of one when the 
 pre-intervention period is itself not an intervention, and that the post-intervention 
indicator variables only take on the value of one when the post-intervention period 
is an intervention. The estimates using this alternative procedure, reported in 
 columns 5–8, are very similar to the baseline estimates.
IV. Underlying Mechanisms
Turning to mechanisms, we now provide evidence that much of the increase in 
imports from the US likely arose through direct government purchases.
Quantitively speaking, the purchase of goods by governments would be large 
enough to account for the CIA intervention induced increases in imports from the 
US observed in the data.35 In addition, it is well-known that government purchases 
34 Note that we have already minimized this issue by performing the event study on “install and support” 
 interventions only.
35 As a share of GDP, government purchases have typically been around 20 percent for industrialized nations 
and 15 percent for developing nations (Baldwin 1970, p. 58; Audet 2002). Removing compensation to employees 
and focusing only on purchases of goods, the figures become 10.3 and 8.8 percent, respectively (Audet 2002). These 
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are highly discriminatory, with suppliers typically based on criteria other than low-
est costs (Baldwin 1970; Lowinger 1976; Audet 2002), and that influence, power, 
and connections are important factors that affect governments’ choice of suppliers 
(Cingano and Pinotti 2010; Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2008).
We test for the government-procurement channel by examining whether the esti-
mated impact of CIA interventions on US imports is greater in countries where the 
government controls a greater share of the economy, which we measure using the share 
of government expenditures in GDP, taken from the Penn World Tables 6.3. Estimation 
results are reported in columns 1–3 of Table 2. Column 1 reproduces the baseline esti-
mate from column 3 of Table 1, but with a smaller sample size due to missing govern-
ment expenditure data.36 Column 2 reports estimates of a specification that allows the 
figures can be compared to the predicted intervention-induced increase in imports based on our estimates. The mean of 
US imports relative to total GDP in the sample is 0.002 or 0.2 percent. (For the observation in the ninetieth percentile 
the figure is still only 0.060 or 6 percent.) According to the estimate from column 3 of Table 1, interventions increase 
US imports (as a share of GDP) by 29.3 percent. Therefore, for a country initially at the mean US import-to-GDP 
ratio, US imports relative to GDP would increase from 0.20 percent to 0.26 percent. For a country at the ninetieth 
percentile, the increase would be from 6.0 percent to 7.8 percent. Therefore, the predicted increase in imports can 
be fully accounted for by government purchases, given that the average share of government purchases to GDP is 
approximately 9–10 percent.
36 Data on government expenditure share are unavailable for all countries, and are only available from 1950.
Table 2— Causal Mechanisms
ln normalized imports US
Country-year level Country-year-industry level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
US influence 0.242** −0.006 0.006 0.245*** 0.260***
(0.114) (0.167) (0.168) (0.081) (0.080)
US influence × Govt share 1.368*** 1.333***
 of GDP (0.521) (0.516)
US influence ×  I High Govt Purchases 0.176**
(0.073)
US influence ×  I High Govt Imports 0.141*
(0.072)
Govt share of GDP No Yes Yes No No
Govt share of GDP No No Yes No No
 × All controls
 R 2 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.648 0.648
Observations 3,710 3,710 3,710 142,243 142,243
Notes: In columns 1–3, the unit of observation is a country c, in year t, where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. In col-
umns 4 and 5, the unit of observation is a country c, in year t, in a 2-digit SITC industry i, where t ranges from 
1962 to 1989. The dependent variable is the natural log of the imports from the US divided by total GDP. All 
regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, ln per capita income, an 
indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, a democracy indicator, as well as Baier and Bergstrand (2009) 
controls for trade costs and multilateral resistance terms. These are a function of the natural log of bilateral dis-
tance, an indicator variable for a common language, an indicator variable for a shared border, an indicator for both 
trading partners being GATT participants, and an indicator for the trading partners being part of a regional trade 
agreement. Columns 4 and 5 also include industry fixed effects. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West stan-
dard errors in brackets in columns 1–3 and with standard errors clustered at the country-year level in brackets in 
columns 4 and 5.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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effect of CIA interventions to differ depending on the government’s share of GDP. As 
shown, the interaction between USinfluenc e t, c and the government expenditure share is 
positive and statistically significant.
The magnitudes of the estimates suggest significant heterogeneity across obser-
vations. To see this, first note that the government expenditure shares for obser-
vations at the tenth and nineteenth percentiles are 0.077 (i.e., 7.7 percent) and 
0.277. According to the estimates, the effect of CIA interventions on observations 
between the tenth and nineteenth percentiles range from 0.099 to 0.373.37 For the 
mean observation (with government expenditure share equal to 0.172 ) the esti-
mated impact is 0.223, which is close to the estimate of 0.242 from column 1.38 
The coefficient for USinfluenc e t, c provides the estimated impact of US interven-
tions for a hypothetical country with zero government expenditure. Therefore, it 
can be interpreted as the estimated effect of interventions after shutting down the 
channel that works through the government. The estimated coefficient is positive, 
small, and not statistically different from zero, which suggests that direct govern-
ment purchases may potentially explain nearly all of the effect of CIA interven-
tions on US imports.
In column 3, we test the robustness of the findings from column 2 by interact-
ing all variables, not just USinfluenc e t, c , with the government’s share of GDP. As 
shown, the estimates remain robust, and the magnitudes of the coefficients of inter-
est change little.
An alternative strategy is to examine heterogeneity across industries, testing 
whether US imports are greater in industries in which governments tend to be active 
purchasers. Utilizing a South Korean 413-industry Input-Output (I-O) table from 
2000, we construct measures of the proportion of total output from each industry 
that is sold to the government and the share of each industry’s imports purchased by 
the government. Because the government-intensity measures for South Korea may 
be an imperfect measure for the other intervened countries in the sample,39 we do 
not rely on the finer variation in the South Korean government purchase intensity 
measures. Instead, we use the information to create two broad categories, dividing 
industries into those with above median levels of government purchases (or imports) 
and those with below median levels. The assumption is that the coarser measure is 
more likely to be similar for the other intervened countries in the sample.
Using the industry-level measures of government purchase intensity, we estimate 
a variant of our baseline equation, but allow for differential impacts by industry:
(10)  ln   m t, c, i US  _ Y t, c   =   α t +  α c +  α i +  β 1 USinfluenc e t, c +  β 2 USinfluenc e t, c ×  I i 
HighGovt 
 + ϕln  τ t, c US − ϕ[ln  P t US + ln  P t, c ] +  X t, c Γ +  ε t, c, i ,
37 The effects for each percentile are calculated as follows: −0.006 + (0.077 × 1.368) = 0.099 and −0.006 + 
(0.277 × 1.368) = 0.373.
38 Calculated as follows: −0.006 + (0.172 × 1.368) = 0.223.
39 In particular, the fact that South Korea is one of the only countries with detailed Input-Output accounts sug-
gests that it may be more developed with a better functioning bureaucracy relative to the other intervened countries 
in the sample.
880 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW ApRIl 2013
where the unit of observation is a year t, a country c, and an industry i. In addi-
tion to year fixed effects, country fixed effects, and the full set of covariates, the 
specification also includes industry fixed effects. As well, the dependent variable is 
the natural log of imports from the US into country c in year t in industry i (normal-
ized by total GDP). Unlike the aggregate-level COW trade data, the industry level 
data, which are from the United Nations’ Comtrade Database, only begin in 1962. 
Therefore the sample only includes years between 1962 and 1989.
Estimates of equation (10), reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2, show that 
the impact of CIA interventions is greater in industries for which governments are 
active consumers and importers. The impact in government-intensive industries is 
72 percent greater in column 4, and 54 percent greater in column 5; both differences 
are statistically significant. Therefore, evidence from industry heterogeneity also 
suggests that government purchases are an important part of the explanation for the 
increase in US imports.
We also examine whether there is evidence that US influence was used to liberal-
ize trade or foreign direct investment (FDI) policies, which in turn may have led to 
increased imports from the US. We find no evidence for either mechanism. Using 
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis we examine whether interventions were 
followed by increases in US FDI in the intervened country. We find no evidence of 
a positive relationship between interventions and FDI. As well, controlling for US 
FDI has no impact on the relationship between CIA interventions and imports from 
the US (see Appendix Table A4, columns 1–4).
We test for the tariff mechanism using information from the International 
Customs Journal, an International Customs Tariff Bureau publication, that reports 
countries’ tariff schedules on a continuous basis. When a country significantly 
changes its tariff structure, a new “volume” is published for the country. If minor 
changes to the tariff structure are made, then a “supplement” to the most recent 
volume is published. Therefore, we use the publication of a new volume as an 
indication that there was restructuring of the country’s tariffs. We find that CIA 
interventions had no impact on the probability of a change in the tariffs structure. 
We also find that US interventions did not have a greater impact on US imports 
after a revision to the intervened-country’s tariff schedule (see Appendix Table A4, 
columns 5 and 6).40
V. Testing Alternative Explanations
A. Trade Integration Explanation
We now turn to potential alternative explanations for the relationship between 
CIA interventions and increased US imports. A plausible alternative explanation 
is that CIA interventions resulted in increased openness between the US and the 
intervened country, and this increased the country’s imports from the US (but not 
exports to the US). To test for this possibility, we move to the industry level and 
examine which industries experienced the greatest surge in US imports following 
40 In practice, this is implemented by constructing a variable that equals one for interventions that follow a 
change in the tariff structure during an intervention episode.
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an intervention. If the increase in imports arose because of a decrease in trading 
frictions, then the increase in shipments from the US should have been in indus-
tries in which the US had a comparative advantage. With an increase in openness, 
countries increasingly export the goods that they have a relative cost advantage in 
producing and import the goods they have a relative disadvantage in producing. 
This logic of comparative advantage is central to standard models of international 
trade ranging from the textbook Ricardian or Heckscher-Ohlin models of trade 
to more recent models of comparative advantage with firm heterogeneity (e.g., 
Bernard, Redding, and Schott 2007). Even in models like Dornbusch, Fischer, 
and Samuelson (1977), where integration results in a wider range of goods that 
are exported, the new goods that are exported are still comparative advantage 
goods and not comparative disadvantage goods. Although the new exports within 
the comparative advantage industries are not the goods for which the countries 
have the greatest comparative advantage, since these goods were already being 
exported, they are still comparative advantage industries.
Testing the trade integration explanation requires a measure of US competitive-
ness across industries and time periods. For this we use Balassa’s (1965) measure 
of revealed comparative advantage (RCA). The measure, which captures the degree 
of specialization of a country in a particular industry, is given by
 RC A t,c,i  
 x t,c,i  _  ∑ c    x t,c,i  /   ∑ i 
  x t,c,i  _  ∑ i   ∑ c    x t,c,i   ,
where  x t,c,i denotes the aggregate exports of country c in a 2, 3, or 4-digit Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) industry i in year t. The RCA measure 
is a ratio of two ratios. The first ratio, the numerator, is country c’s share of world 
exports in industry i. The second ratio, the denominator, is country c’s share of 
world exports in all industries. Thus, RCA compares a country’s share of global 
exports in industry i to its share across all industries. If the ratio is above one, then 
the country captures a greater share of global exports in industry i than it does 
on average, which is taken as an indication that the country has a comparative 
advantage in producing in industry i. If the ratio is less than one, then the country 
captures less of the world export share in industry i than it does on average.41
Examining our constructed industry-specific RCA measures for the US in each 
year of the sample, we find the measures are consistent with intuition. In general, the 
US had low relative export shares in low-end manufacturing industries like bever-
ages, footwear, and textiles, and high export shares in high-end industries like trans-
port equipment, scientific equipment, chemicals, and firearms. For the interested 
reader, we report the US RCA measures at the SITC 2-digit level for two years, 1962 
and 1989, in the online Appendix.
41 One may be concerned that RCA is an imprecise measure of comparative advantage for sectors, like agricul-
ture, that have sizable export subsidies. Omitting agriculture from the analysis yields estimates that are qualitatively 
identical to what we report here. Further details are provided in the online Appendix.
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Using the constructed RCA measures, we test whether following an intervention, 
the increase in imports from the US was greatest in industries in which the US had 
a comparative advantage. The estimating equation is
(11) ln   m t,c,i US  _ Y t, c   =  α t +  α c +  α i +  β 1 USinfluenc e t,c 
 +  β 2 USinfluenc e t,c × US RC A t,i 
 +  β 3 USinfluenc e t,c × ImporterRC A t,c,i 
 +  β 4 US RC A t,i +  β 5 ImporterRC A t,c,i 
 + ϕ ln  τ t,c US − ϕ[ln  P t US + ln  P t,c ] +  X t,c Γ +  ε t,c,i .
As in equation (10), t denotes years, c countries, and i industries; the dependent 
variable is the natural log of imports from the US into country c in year t in industry i 
(normalized by total GDP); and the specification includes year fixed effects, country 
fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the full set of covariates.
In equation (11), we allow the effect of an intervention to differ across industries 
depending on the extent to which the importing country has a comparative advantage 
in industry i and, most importantly, depending on the extent to which the US has a 
comparative advantage in industry i. The variables ImporterRC A t,c,i and US RC A t,i 
measure importer and US comparative advantage in the production of good i in 
year t.42 If the increase in imports is from a decrease in transaction-costs, then we 
expect  β 2 > 0. The increase in US imports should have been greater in industries in 
which the US had a greater comparative advantage. If the increase in trade did not 
arise because of comparative advantage, then we no longer expect  β 2 > 0. Instead, 
it is likely that the US pushed to sell less competitive products that firms would have 
difficulty selling otherwise. If this was the case then we expect  β 2 ≤ 0. Therefore, 
the sign of  β 2 provides a test of the integration and influence explanations.
Estimates of equation (11) are reported in columns 1–3 of Table 3. We report 
standard errors clustered at the country-year level.43 In all specifications, the esti-
mated coefficients for USinfluenc e t,c × US RC A t,c are negative and statistically sig-
nificant, indicating that interventions increased imports more in industries in which 
the US had a comparative disadvantage, not comparative advantage. This finding 
is in  contrast to what is expected if the increase in trade were from increased inte-
gration with the US.44 See the online Appendix for details. Therefore, CIA inter-
ventions had a non-negative effect on the purchase of US products in nearly every 
42 To allow an easy interpretation of the magnitudes of the estimated effects, we have normalized US RC A t,i and 
ImporterRC A t,c,i to lie between zero and one by subtracting the minimum value of the variable and then dividing 
by the maximum value.
43 Clustering produces standard errors that are larger in magnitude than Newey-West standard errors. Therefore, 
to be as conservative as possible, we report the clustered standard errors.
44 The total effect of USinfluenc e t,c on imports from the US is given by  β 1 +  β 2 US RC A t,i +  β 3 ImporterRC A t,c,i . Examining this, we find that for nearly all observations (countries, years, and industries), the 
total effect of USinfluenc e t,c is greater than or equal to zero. This is also confirmed when we estimate equation (7) 
industry-by-industry.
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industry, and the effects were greatest in industries in which the US was globally 
least competitive.
A potential criticism of the RCA measure is that it does not distinguish between 
a country’s exports to developed countries (DCs) and its exports to less developed 
countries (LDCs). The two groups of countries may represent different segmented 
markets. Since the market size of LDCs is much smaller than of DCs, when the US 
serves the LDC market, its share of total world exports may be low, and therefore 
its measure of RCA may also be low. If interventions decreased bilateral trade costs 
between the US and the intervened LDCs, then this may have caused the US to spe-
cialize more in products that serve the LDC market and, as a result, imports from the 
US increased most in industries with low measures of RCA.
According to this explanation, the test fails because we are incorrectly measuring 
RCA. Rather than measuring RCA using exports to the whole world, we should mea-
sure RCA using exports to LDCs only. We check for this possibility by  constructing 
an alternative measure of RCA that is calculated using only the share of exports to 
LDCs, rather than the share of exports globally.45 Estimates using the alternative 
RCA measure are reported in columns 4–6 of Table 3. As shown, the results are 
nearly identical using the alternative RCA measure.
45 We define the LDC market to be countries other than Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, East 
and West Germany, Denmark, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, France, Finland, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.
Table 3—Testing the Trade Costs Explanation Using Revealed Comparative Advantage
ln normalized imports from the US
World market RCA Developing country market RCA
2-digit 
industries
3-digit 
industries
4-digit 
industries
2-digit 
industries
3-digit 
industries
4-digit 
industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US influence 0.524*** 0.447*** 0.391*** 0.532*** 0.465*** 0.390***
(0.107) (0.093) (0.088) (0.107) (0.091) (0.085)
US influence −1.202** −1.496** −1.511** −1.601** −1.426*** −1.290***
 × US RCA (0.490) (0.632) (0.590) (0.622) (0.520) (0.438)
US RCA 2.279*** 4.808*** 4.103*** 3.004*** 3.494*** 2.383***
(0.259) (0.213) (0.182) (0.313) (0.263) (0.321)
 R 2 0.668 0.644 0.638 0.668 0.628 0.637
Observations 131,895 330,358 553,842 131,895 330,358 553,842
Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t in a 2-, 3-, or 4-digit SITC industry i, where t ranges from 
1962 to 1989. The dependent variable is the natural log of imports from the US normalized by total GDP. All 
regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, industry fixed effects, Baier and Bergstrand multilat-
eral resistance terms, a Soviet intervention control, importer RCA, importer RCA interacted with US influence, ln 
per capita income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, a democracy indicator, as well as Baier 
and Bergstrand (2009) controls for trade costs and multilateral resistance terms. These are a function of the natu-
ral log of bilateral distance, an indicator variable for a common language, an indicator variable for a shared bor-
der, an indicator for both trading partners being GATT participants, and an indicator for the trading partners being 
part of a regional trade agreement. Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the country-year level 
in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Overall, the results provide evidence against the hypothesis that the increase in 
US imports following an intervention was the result of increased integration with 
the US.
B. Political Ideology Explanation
In light of existing evidence that countries with more similar political ideologies 
trade more (e.g., Dixon and Moon 1993), it is possible that the increase in imports 
from the US can be explained by a change in the ideology of the intervened country 
following an intervention. According to this explanation, the increase in US imports 
arose not because of US influence, but because the new regime has an ideology that 
is more aligned with Western countries, including the US.
Testing this hypothesis requires that we examine whether imports from countries 
with an ideology similar to the US also increased following CIA interventions. Our 
current estimating equations, because they only examine a country’s imports from 
the US, cannot be used for this purpose. Therefore, we estimate a regression that 
examines each country’s imports from all exporters, not just the US. The estimating 
equation, derived from equation (2) in Section II, is given by
(12)  ln   m t, c, e  _  Y t, c Y t e  =   α t +  α c, e +  β 1 USinfluenc e t, c +  β 2 USinfluenc e t, c ×  I e 
US 
 + ϕln  τ t, c, e − ϕ[ln  P t, c + ln  P t, e ] +  X t, c Γ +  X t, e Ω +  ε t, c, e ,
where t indexes years, c indexes importers, and e indexes exporters. The dependent 
variable is the natural log of imports into country c from exporting country e in 
year t divided by the product of the total GDP of countries c and e. Equation (12) 
includes time period fixed effects  α t , and country-pair fixed effects  α c, e , as well as 
the same vector of importer covariates as in equation (7),  X t, c . Also included are the 
same covariates, but measured for exporters,  X t, e .
As in equation (7), our variable of interest is USinfluenc e t, c , which equals one 
if the importing country c experienced a CIA intervention in year t. Because we 
now include all country-pairs in the sample, we allow the effect of interventions on 
imports to differ depending on whether the exporter is American or not. In practice, 
this is done by also including USinfluenc e t, c ×  I e US in the estimating equation, where 
I e 
US is an indicator variable that equals one if the exporter is the US. The coefficient, 
β 2 , provides a test of whether the impact of CIA interventions on imports from the 
US ( β 1 +  β 2 ) is statistically different from its impact on imports from other coun-
tries ( β 1 ).
The estimate of equation (12), reported in column 1 of Table 4, yields results that 
are qualitatively identical to the baseline findings. According to the estimates of  β 1 
and  β 2 , interventions decreased imports from non-US countries by 4.5 percent and 
increased imports from the US by 25.4 percent, which is close to the estimate of 
29.3 percent from equation (7) reported in column 3 of Table 1. The estimated nega-
tive impact on non-US exporters is also consistent with the finding from Table 1 that 
the increase in US imports arose through trade diversion and not trade creation. The 
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magnitudes of     β1 and     β2 suggest that the increase in imports from the US is roughly 
offset by the decrease in imports from other countries.46
We next test whether the differential impact of CIA interventions on imports from 
the US is robust to controlling for the ideology of exporters. We use US ideology 
as a reference point and construct a measure of similarity to the US using voting 
data from the UN General Assembly. Define  d t, c to be the sum of the vote distance 
between country c and the US for all votes in year t, where a vote in opposition to the 
US is given a distance of one, and a vote with the US is given a distance of zero.47 
46 To see this, first note that for the average observation, the share of total imports that are from the US is 
18.9 percent. If we let  m o denote a country’s initial level of total imports, then the predicted intervention-induced 
increase in imports from the increase in US trade is given by 0.254 × 0.189 ×  m o = 0.048 m o . The decrease in 
imports from non-US exporters is given by 0.045 × (1 − 0.189) ×  m o = 0.037 m o .
47 See Gartzke (2006) for details. The measure we use ignores abstentions. An alternative is to code a value of 
two for votes against the US, a value of one for abstentions, and zero for votes with the US. Using this alternative 
Table 4—Testing the Political Ideology Explanation
ln normalized bilateral imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
US influence −0.045* 0.308*** −0.062** −0.056* −0.061*
(0.024) (0.079) (0.028) (0.030) (0.031)
US influence × 0.300*** 0.407*** 0.231** 0.274** 0.265**
 US exporter (0.111) (0.112) (0.115) (0.113) (0.113)
US influence × −0.440***
 US alignment of exporter, V US (0.091)
US influence × 0.083*
 NATO member exporter (0.045)
US influence × 0.037
 OECD member exporter (0.044)
US influence × 0.050
 Western European exporter (0.043)
 R 2 0.792 0.792 0.792 0.792 0.792
Observations 236,384 217,460 236,384 236,384 236,384
Calculated effect of US influence on imports from different exporters
US influence on 0.254** 0.276** 0.251** 0.254** 0.254**
 imports from US (0.109) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109)
US influence on −0.045* −0.015 −0.046* −0.046* −0.046*
 imports from avg. exporter (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Notes: The unit of observation is a country-pair in year t, where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. The dependent vari-
able is the natural log of imports into country c from country e in year t normalized by the product of total GDP 
of country c and of country e. All regressions include year fixed effects, country-pair fixed effects, ln importer per 
capita income, ln exporter per capita income, a Soviet intervention control (and the same interactions as for the CIA 
intervention variable), an indicator for importer leader turnover, an indicator for exporter leader turnover, importer 
current leader tenure, exporter current leader tenure, an importer democracy indicator, and an exporter democracy 
indicator. All specifications also include Baier and Bergstrand (2009) controls for trade costs and multilateral resis-
tance terms. These are a function of the natural log of bilateral distance, an indicator variable for a shared border, 
an indicator variable for a common language, an indicator for both trading partners being participants of GATT, and 
an indicator for both being part of a regional trade agreement. The specifications always also control for the compo-
nents of the interaction term. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Also define  d t 
max to be the maximum sum of vote distances possible in year t. We 
then construct the following measure of country c’s voting similarity with the US 
in year t:
  V t, c 
US ≡ 1 −    d t, c  _ 
 d t 
max 
 .
The measure ranges from 0 to 1, and is increasing in the country’s vote similarity 
with the US.48
Using  V t, c 
US we can test whether US interventions caused imports from countries 
that were ideologically similar to the US to also increase, and whether the differ-
ential impact of CIA interventions on imports from the US is robust to controlling 
for differential impacts based on ideology. This is done by altering equation (12) to 
allow the impact of CIA interventions on imports to differ systematically depending 
on the political ideology of the exporter:
(13)  ln   m t, c, e  _ Y t, c Y t, e   =  α t +  α c, e +  β 1 USinfluenc e t, c 
  +  β 2 USinfluenc e t, c ×  I e US +  β 3 USinfluenc e t, c ×  V t, e US 
  +  β 4  V t, e US + ϕln τ t, c, e − ϕ[ P t, c +  P t, e ]
  +  X t, c Γ +  X t, e Ω +  ε t, c, e .
The added interaction term, USinfluenc e t, c ×  V t, e US, controls for the possibility that 
exports from countries that were ideologically similar to the US also increased fol-
lowing CIA interventions. If  β 2 , the coefficient for USinfluenc e t, c ×  I e US , becomes 
insignificant with the addition of this control, this is evidence for the political 
alignment explanation. We are also interested in the sign of  β 3 , the coefficient for 
USinfluenc e t, c ×  V t, e US . If the ideology explanation is correct then we expect the coef-
ficient to be positive.
Estimation results are reported in column 2 of Table 4. The estimate of  β 2 remains 
robust to the inclusion of the new interaction term. The coefficient remains positive and 
significant, suggesting the existence of a greater impact of CIA intervention on imports 
from the US even after allowing for heterogeneity based on exporters’ political ideol-
ogy. The bottom panel of the table reports the estimated impact of CIA interventions 
on imports from the US and on imports from a country with a value of  V t, e US equal to the 
sample average. The calculated impact for the US is very similar to the baseline impact 
from column 1. As well, the impact for an “average” exporter is negative (consistent 
with trade diversion), although the figure is not statistically different from zero.
coding yields qualitatively identical results to what we report here.
48 One concern is that voting similarity may not accurately reflect similarity in political ideology. We check this 
possibility by examining the correlation between a country’s voting alignment with the US and a measure of left, 
center or right political alignment from Keefer (2005). The political alignment data are only available from 1975. 
However, coding left, center, and right alignments as 1, 2, and 3, respectively, we find a strong positive correlation 
between the two measures. Regressing US vote similarity on political alignment yields a standardized beta coef-
ficient of 0.29 and a t-statistic of 10.55.
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Columns 3–5 of Table 4 report results using alternative measures of exporters’ 
alignment with the US. Rather than using UN voting data, we also measure  V t, e US 
using indicator variables that equal one if: (i) exporter e was a NATO member, 
(ii) exporter e was among the original OECD members (from 1961), or (iii) exporter 
e is from Western Europe (or is the USA).49 In all three specifications, the estimated 
differential impact of CIA interventions on imports from the US remains positive 
and statistically significant. Further, the implied impact on US imports (reported 
in the bottom panel of the table) remains very stable across the three specifica-
tions. The implied impact of CIA interventions on the average non-US exporter is 
negative and statistically significant in each specification. Further, the magnitude is 
very similar to the baseline magnitude reported in column 1 of the table. As well, 
we find that as in column 2, there is no statistically significant differential impact 
of CIA interventions based on a country’s political alignment with the US. The 
one  exception is for NATO membership, where we estimate a positive and signifi-
cant differential impact. However, according to the magnitudes of the coefficient 
estimates, the impact of CIA interventions on imports from NATO members is still 
zero (with a coefficient of 0.021 (i.e., −0.062 + 0.083) and standard error of 0.037).
C. US Loans and Grants Explanation
If interventions led to an increase in foreign aid from the US, particularly tied or 
conditional aid, then this could explain the increase in US imports.50 To test for this 
possibility, we examine the value of US economic aid (which includes grants and 
concessional loans) and military aid (which includes grants, concessional loans, 
and training) received by each country, and test whether CIA interventions led to an 
increase in US foreign aid, and whether the changes in aid are able to account for 
the observed increase in US imports.51
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, we report estimates of our baseline estimating equa-
tion (7) with either military aid or economic aid as the dependent variable.52 The results 
show that both forms of aid increased following CIA interventions. In column 3, we 
examine loans given by the US Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank), an institution with 
a mandate to provide loans to foreign firms that want but are having trouble obtaining 
financing from private lenders. The estimate from column 3 shows that CIA inter-
ventions also led to an increase in Ex-Im Bank loans, although the magnitude of the 
impact and statistical significance is lower than for either type of foreign aid.
Columns 5–8 of Table 5 report estimates that test whether the increases in aid and 
loans are able to account for the increase in US imports following an intervention. 
49 An alternative strategy is to use voting as a measure of ideological similarity, but to examine a more homogenous 
group of exporters, namely only NATO, OECD, or Western European exporters. For these more homogenous export-
ers, UN voting arguably better reflects ideological differences between the countries. Undertaking this strategy, we 
continue to find a differential impact of CIA interventions on imports from the US. These results are reported in the 
online Appendix.
50 The fact that US imports increased most in low US RCA industries suggests that if this explanation is correct, 
then the provision of grants and loans were used to promote US sales in industries in which US firms were less 
competitive. This would also be an interesting and important finding.
51 The data are from the US Agency for International Development’s (USAID) US Overseas Loans and Grants, 
Obligations and Loan Authorizations.
52 The aid variables are measured as the natural log of one plus their value. The specifications reported do not 
include the controls for multilateral resistance terms. The results are qualitatively identical if these terms are included.
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We do this by estimating equation (7) while controlling for military aid, economic 
aid, and Ex-Im Bank loans. The variables enter one at a time in columns 5–7 and 
simultaneously in column 8. (Column 4 reports the baseline estimate for compari-
son.) We find that economic aid enters with positive and significant coefficients, 
while military aid enters with insignificant coefficients that are very close to zero. 
This suggests that part of US economic aid was used to import US products, which 
is unsurprising since US economic aid is often tied to purchases from US produc-
ers. The insignificant coefficient for military aid is also unsurprising, since much 
of military aid is spent on goods exported overseas to support US troops and other 
personnel, and these goods are not included in the IMF’s Direction of Trade statis-
tics (International Monetary Fund 1993). The coefficients for Ex-Im Bank loans are 
also positive, as expected.
Controlling for the grants and loans variables we observe a modest decline in the 
estimated coefficients for USinfluenc e t, c . The coefficient magnitudes are reduced by 
at most 16 percent (in column 8). This suggests that although increases in US loans 
and grants are able to explain some of the effect of interventions on imports from the 
US, it is a modest proportion of the total. This is consistent with the fact that foreign 
aid flows are not large enough to account for the observed increase in imports from 
the US.53
53 The ratio of US total aid to US imports is 0.15 for the median observation in the sample. Therefore, even if 
an intervention-induced increase in US aid was transformed one-for-one into imports (which in reality is far from 
true), CIA interventions would need to increase aid by 195 percent to increase imports by the observed 29.3 percent 
(195 percent × 0.15 = 29.3 percent). The estimated effects of interventions on US aid found in columns 1–3 of 
Table 5 are much lower than this, ranging from 20–80 percent.
Table 5—The Role of US Loans and Grants
Military 
aid
Economic 
aid
Ex-Im 
Bank 
loans ln normalized imports from the US
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
US influence 0.794*** 0.802*** 0.200 0.293*** 0.272** 0.252** 0.283*** 0.246**
(0.211) (0.242) (0.122) (0.109) (0.107) (0.101) (0.106) (0.098)
ln (1 + 0.032 −0.012
 US military aid) (0.031) (0.028)
ln (1 + 0.058** 0.064***
 US economic aid) (0.026) (0.023)
ln (1 + 0.049*** 0.050***
 Ex-Im Bank loans) (0.014) (0.014)
 R 2 0.566 0.548 0.409 0.836 0.836 0.838 0.837 0.839
Observations 4,149 4,149 4,149 4,149 4,149 4,149 4,149 4,149
Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t, where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. In columns 1–3, the depen-
dent variables are the natural log of the measure of aid that is reported in the column heading. In columns 4–8, the 
dependent variable is the natural log of imports from the US divided by total GDP. All regressions include year 
fixed effects, country fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, ln per capita income, an indicator for leader turn-
over, current leader tenure, and a democracy indicator. Columns 4–8 also include Baier and Bergstrand (2009) con-
trols for trade costs and multilateral resistance terms. These are a function of the natural log of bilateral distance, 
an indicator variable for a common language, an indicator variable for a shared border, an indicator for both trading 
partners being GATT participants and an indicator for the trading partners being part of a regional trade agreement. 
Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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These results come with the important caveat that the aid measures used in the 
analysis only include official aid flows and do not include covert aid from the CIA. 
Therefore, we are unable to rule out the possibility that the impact of CIA interven-
tions are explained by covert aid.
VI. Conclusions
We have provided evidence that covert CIA interventions increased the influence 
of the US over foreign governments, and that this was used to increase US exports to 
the intervened countries. Consistent with the influence mechanism, the increase was 
greatest in industries in which the US had a comparative disadvantage. Our analysis 
was able to rule out alternative explanations for the increase in imports from the US, 
including decreased trade costs, changing political ideology and increased US loans 
and grants.
Our findings contribute to several literatures. First, they complement the existing 
evidence on the importance of political economy determinants of trade flows by 
showing that CIA interventions also affect the pattern of trade.54 As well, by isolat-
ing the role of political influence, our findings provide support for existing evidence 
that influence and power play an important role in international trade.55 Finally, our 
findings also add to existing studies that examine, both qualitatively and quantita-
tively, the history of the CIA using recently declassified documents.56
There are a number of natural directions for future research. The first is a more 
fine-grained examination of the mechanisms underlying our results. Although the 
macro-level evidence we have presented indicate that government procurement con-
tracts play an important role, we still require a deeper understanding of the precise 
mechanisms. Most likely, this requires micro-level data that captures the means by 
which government contracts are assigned to suppliers from the US, and the precise 
lobbying/bidding process by which low comparative advantage manufacturers are 
able to gain a disproportionate share of these contracts. The second is to examine 
additional consequences of CIA interventions. We have examined the effects of a 
specific type of CIA intervention on one dimension of international trade. However, 
interventions may have had a host of additional impacts, both at macro and micro 
levels. For instance, the financial consequences of CIA interventions remain largely 
unexplored and may constitute a promising area of future research.
54 See for example Verdier (1998); Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff (2000, 2002); Russett and Oneal (2001); 
Frye and Mansfield (2003); Kono (2006); and Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse (2008).
55 See Yeats (1990); Gowa and Mansfield (1993); Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff (2002); Kuziemko and 
Werker (2006); Dreher and Jensen (2007); and Kilby (2009).
56 See for example Weiner (2007) and Dube, Kaplan, and Naidu (2011).
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Appendix
A. Derivation of Baier and Bergstrand (2009) MR Terms for Total Trade
Goods market clearing gives  Y t, c =  ∑ j=1 N  m t, c, j , and therefore  ∑ j≠c    m t, c, j =  Y t, c −  m t, c, c .57 Denote  ∑ j≠c    m t, c, j , which is country c’s total foreign imports (i.e., 
purchases from other countries), by  m t, c W . Then,
(A1)  m t, c W =  Y t, c −  m t, c, c .
We know from equation (1) that
(A2)  m t, c, c =   Y t, c Y t, c  _ Y t W   [  τ t, c, c  _  P t, c  P t, c  ] 1−σ .
Substituting (A2) into (A1) and rearranging gives
  m t, c 
W
 =   Y t, c  ∑ j≠c 
 
  Y t, j 
 _ Y t W   [  τ t, c, c  _ P t, c 2   ] 1−σ .
 The equation we estimate is given by
(A3) ln   m t, c W  _   Y t, c  ∑ j≠c    Y t, j  = −ln  Y t 
W + (1 − σ)ln  τ t, c, c − 2(1 − σ)ln  P t, c .
And ln  P t, c can be approximated using the Baier and Bergstrand (2009) method:
(A4) ln  P t, c =  ∑ 
j=1
N
  θ t, j ln  τ t, c, j −  1 _ 2  ∑ k=1
N
  ∑ 
m=1
 
N
  θ t, k  θ t, m ln  τ t, k, m .
Equation (A3) can then be estimated, with ln  P t, c given by equation (A4) and ln  τ t, c, c 
given by equation (4). The estimating equation for world exports can be derived in 
the same manner.
57 We are grateful to Scott Baier for providing the derivation of the Baier and Bergstrand (2009) method for total 
imports and exports.
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B. Appendix Tables
Table A1—Controlling for the Selection of Interventions
ln normalized imports from the US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US influence 0.238** 0.363*** 0.238*** 0.228**
(0.100) (0.123) (0.083) (0.115)
Five year pre-trend of 0.293***
 dependent variable (0.037)
Five year pre-onset fixed effect 0.321**
(0.161)
Sanctions −0.616***
(0.194)
Alliance with US 0.717**
(0.340)
Threat of force 1.295
(1.681)
Show of force −0.358
(0.349)
Use of force −0.137
(0.182)
Exchange rate 0.0003
(0.0002)
Inflation −0.164
(0.134)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
 R 2 0.868 0.837 0.845 0.867
Observations 3,365 4,149 4,149 3,630
Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t, where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. The dependent variable is 
the natural log of the share of imports from the US. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, 
a Soviet intervention control, ln per capita income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, a democ-
racy indicator, as well as Baier and Bergstrand (2009) controls for trade costs and multilateral resistance terms. 
These are a function of the natural log of bilateral distance, an indicator variable for a common language, an indica-
tor variable for a shared border, an indicator for both trading partners being GATT participants, and an indicator for 
the trading partners being part of a regional trade agreement. Column 1 controls for 5-year pre-trends of the depen-
dent variable (log changes in the dependent variable between periods t − 6 and t − 1). Column 2 includes an indi-
cator variable that equals one if period t is within 5 years prior to the start of an intervention episode. Coefficients 
are reported with Newey-West standard errors in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A2—Additional Robustness Checks
ln normalized imports from the US
Poisson 
Maximum 
Likelihood LDV, no FE LDV, FE Bruno (2005)
Alternative 
influence 
variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
US influence 0.297*** 0.095*** 0.105** 0.098**
(0.078) (0.025) (0.042) (0.041)
US influence 0.302**
 (install and support) (0.146)
US influence 0.282**
 (support only) (0.139)
Lagged dependent 0.891*** 0.735***
 variable (0.015) (0.034)
Country fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes
 R 2 0.921 0.928 0.836
Observations 4,149 3,998 3,998 3,997 4,149
Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t, where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. The dependent variable is 
the natural log of the share of imports from the US. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, 
a Soviet intervention control, ln per capita income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, a democ-
racy indicator, as well as Baier and Bergstrand (2009) controls for trade costs and multilateral resistance terms. 
These are a function of the natural log of bilateral distance, an indicator variable for a common language, an indi-
cator variable for a shared border, an indicator for both trading partners being GATT participants, and an indicator 
for the trading partners being part of a regional trade agreement. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West stan-
dard errors in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A3—Event Study Analysis for “Install and Support” Interventions
ln normalized imports from the US
Baseline estimates Post: intervention only; Pre: non-intervention only
10-year 
window
8-year 
window
6-year 
window
4-year 
window
10-year 
window
8-year 
window
6-year 
window
4-year 
window
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
US influence (install and support):
Pre onset: 0.021 0.126
 Period t − 5 (0.100) (0.123)
Pre onset: −0.033 −0.062 −0.038 −0.019
 Period t − 4 (0.081) (0.082) (0.104) (0.095)
Pre onset: −0.003 0.044 0.091 −0.086 −0.034 0.077
 Period t − 3 (0.119) (0.116) (0.124) (0.115) (0.111) (0.130)
Pre onset: 0.010 0.049 0.077 0.127 −0.008 0.032 0.059 0.082
 Period t − 2 (0.127) (0.128) (0.122) (0.137) (0.139) (0.137) (0.130) (0.130)
Pre onset: −0.157 −0.135 0.020 0.028 −0.198 −0.177 −0.146 −0.130
 Period t − 1 (0.217) (0.214) (0.237) (0.233) (0.234) (0.230) (0.232) (0.232)
Onset year: −0.044 0.065 0.078 0.090 −0.047 0.061 0.068 0.081
 Period t (0.130) (0.145) (0.137) (0.135) (0.130) (0.145) (0.135) (0.133)
Post onset: 0.162 0.188 0.251* 0.277** 0.160 0.185 0.243* 0.269**
 Period 
 t + 1
(0.131) (0.131) (0.132) (0.131) (0.133) (0.132) (0.132) (0.131)
Post onset: 0.224 0.279** 0.298** 0.222 0.276** 0.290**
 Period
 t + 2
(0.139) (0.139) (0.136) (0.141) (0.140) (0.137)
Post onset: 0.183 0.255** 0.182 0.251*
 Period
 t + 3
(0.118) (0.128) (0.122) (0.129)
Post onset: 0.237** 0.236*
 Period 
 t + 4
(0.120) (0.123)
Other post 0.306* 0.322* 0.314** 0.317** 0.303* 0.316* 0.305* 0.307**
 onset
 intervention 
 periods
(0.170) (0.165) (0.157) (0.150) (0.173) (0.168) (0.158) (0.150)
US influence 0.247 0.229 0.257* 0.265* 0.245 0.228 0.258* 0.265*
 (support 
 only)
(0.159) (0.150) (0.143) (0.137) (0.160) (0.151) (0.143) (0.137)
Observations 3,065 3,301 3,540 3,761 3,065 3,301 3,540 3,761
Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t, where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. “Onset year: Period t” is an indicator vari-
able that equals one in the onset year of a CIA “install and support” intervention episode and zero otherwise. “Other intervention 
years” is an indicator variable that equals one in non-onset years of an intervention episode and zero otherwise. The variables “Pre 
onset: Period t − 1” to “Pre onset: Period t − 5” are indicator variables that equal one if an observation is one to five years prior to 
an intervention onset. The variables “Post onset: Period t + 1” to “Post onset: Period t + 4” are indicator variables that equal one if 
an observation is one to four years after an intervention onset. “Other post onset intervention periods” is an indicator variable that 
equals one in all other post onset intervention years. “US influence (support only)” is an indicator variable for CIA interventions 
that support an existing regime. These include nine one-year interventions. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed 
effects, a Soviet intervention control, ln per capita income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, a democracy indi-
cator, as well as Baier and Bergstrand (2009) controls for trade costs and multilateral resistance terms. These are a function of the 
natural log of bilateral distance, an indicator variable for a common language, an indicator variable for a shared border, an indicator 
for both trading partners being GATT participants, and an indicator for the trading partners being part of a regional trade agreement. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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